Written by Managing Principal Consultant, Sarah Booth
In our third and final blog in the Reflections on Fatigue Risk Management (FRM) in European Flight Operations series that is inspired by the EASA /AESA FRM meeting in Madrid this February, our focus moves to Just Culture and Commander’s Discretion.
Just Culture and Commander’s Discretion
These are two evergreen themes of discussion relating to FRM. We must ensure that we are managing fatigue in an environment that is Just, where crew will be supported when reporting errors and when they make difficult safety-related decisions. Occasionally, the terms Just Culture and a non-punitive culture are used interchangeably, particularly when discussing Commander’s Discretion. Of course, a Just Culture is not the same as a non-punitive culture. The concept of the ‘line’, beyond which behaviour is unacceptable, is key within Just Culture, but this line must be clear, well communicated, and consistent.
However, to confuse matters, when specifically talking about Commander’s Discretion the term non-punitive specifically appears in the Regulation*.
Readers of the previous posts will not be surprised that I am referencing my favourite supporting document again – the 3rd edition EASA FTL/FRM Inspector’s Checklist contains checks for Commander’s Discretion policies, how does your policy fair against these checks?
Pilot survey results on Commander’s Discretion
Pilot survey results on Commander’s Discretion Operators must have a non-punitive process for Commander’s Discretion. How successful is this? In a survey that we undertook alongside the European Cockpit Association in 2023, 37.6% (n=2476) of the pilots responding to the survey reported that they were highly concerned or moderately concerned about negative consequences from their airline if they refused to extend a flight duty under Commander’s Discretion. This would indicate that there is still work to do to ensure that crew believe that there will be no negative consequences if they declare that they are not fit to utilise discretion to complete the flight duty – i.e. that the policy is non-punitive, as the regulation requires. (The full survey report can be found here.)
How concerned are you about negative consequences from your airline if you refused to extend a flight duty under Commander's Discretion?
The potential for crew to refuse to enter discretion, alongside the ability of crew members to state that they are not fit to begin or continue a flight duty period, can be the last line of defence when crew are experiencing elevated fatigue levels to the extent that flight safety may be impacted. However, they are also areas of concern for the business, particularly when understanding and maturity of FRM are low. Will there suddenly be loads of crew declaring themselves unfit for work, meaning we need to cancel flights?
Are we facing an unknown risk? The short answer to this concern is, in our experience, generally no. When we survey crew, we find that it is significantly more common that crew report flying when, in retrospect, they were probably too fatigued to have done so. This occurs for multiple reasons, with the most frequent being that the crew do not want to let down their colleagues, their passengers, or their airline. They do not want to be the reason that another crew member is called out from standby, or may not have realised that they were fatigued at the time. Of course, there are always a small number of instances of people using the policy inappropriately – but they are far, far in the minority.
So, what does this mean? Well, in accordance with the Just Culture and Safety Management Policies of most operators, these crew members should be supported, encouraged and even rewarded for making difficult safety-related decisions to reduce risk, and submitting safety reports when an elevated risk (or potential for risk) has been identified. Elevated fatigue levels to the extent that the crew member couldn’t begin or continue a duty period (including through the refusal of Commander’s Discretion to extend a duty period) seems to me like it falls into this category. We don’t want crew to continue to operate when they are not safe to do so, even if they are doing it for the best of intentions. Through effective FRM approaches, we can learn from these instances and put in place protective mitigations to prevent crew from reaching this state.
Increasingly, we are having conversations at conferences around the under-reporting of fatigue – not only from those crew who operated when, in retrospect, they were too fatigued to have done so, but also from those who have experienced lower fatigue levels, or who may have identified a fatiguing feature of the working pattern in the future. Whilst we have other data sources that support our FRM efforts, crew reporting is the lifeblood – and if we have under-reporting, we may be missing a large part of the picture.
Developing mitigation and risk management approaches
Identifying levels of fatigue in the organisation and the contributors to that fatigue level is key to being able to develop effective mitigations and risk management approaches. Our FRM diagnostic is designed to support you, identifying fatigue levels and causes, alongside evaluating the effectiveness of your management system when it comes to FRM. It will leave you with recommendations for improvement, both for mitigation of fatigue levels and to increase the maturity and effectiveness of your management of fatigue.
Read our other blogs in the Reflections on FRM in European Flight Operations series, here:
- Reflections on Fatigue Risk Management in European Flight Operations
- Fatigue Risk Management Competency in European Flight Operations
Explore our FRM consulting services on our Fatigue Risk Management consulting page and our range of FRM training courses, available virtually or in-company, includes:
To find out more, speak to the team at hello@bainessimmons.com.
*ORO.FTL.205(f)(6): ‘The operator shall implement a non-punitive process for the use of the discretion described under this provision and shall describe it in the operations manual’